"You saw [at the FBI] a culture of secrecy, a culture that does not want the information to come out ... This was on a lot of issues that are peripheral to the core of what we are doing but necessary in order for us to be able to release the documents."

---Jeremy Gunn, Former ARRB Executive Director, Speech at Stanford University, May 18, 1998

Now that the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) has sunset, its work product --- the release of millions of pages of previously classified documents --- and final report still need to be digested and judged by researchers and historians in the months, years, and decades to come. I heartily agree with the comments made by Joe Backes and others about the historic precedent set by the ARRB (and the 1992 legislation which established it) regarding our ability to peer inside decades of secrecy maintained by federal agencies. Some of the recent headline-grabbing actions of the ARRB which may go a long way toward enhancing the public's understanding of the JFK assassination include the identification of additional latent autopsy photographs on a roll of film that had been labeled "exposed" by the National Archives; the depositions of the autopsy doctors and other personnel and relevant Bethesda witnesses (including the identification of Saundra Spencer); and helping to convince the National Archives to turn over to the FBI for testing "fibrous debris" found attached to one of the bullet fragments comprising Warren Commission Exhibit #567 (a recommendation originally made by the Firearms Examination Panel of the House Select Committee on Assassinations).

But for every one of these apparent "victories" won by the ARRB, I have to wonder how many dozens of unfinished leads will have been left dangling because of the uncooperative attitude maintained by agencies like the FBI and the all-too-short time frame the ARRB had to complete its mission --- notwithstanding the additional year added to the sunset by 1997 federal legislation.

Consider my request --- dated October 15, 1996 --- to have the ARRB contact the FBI regarding the case files of one Richard Anthony Tullis, Jr. (Attachment 1). Tullis had been identified after the assassination as someone who could have relevant information regarding an effort which apparently had been made to impersonate a pro-Castro Oswald in Dallas in the summer of 1961. (Oswald was in Minsk at the time.) In my estimation, both this incident and the Bolton Ford Dealership episode present us with the tantalizing possibility that Oswald's name and/or identity were for some reason being mixed up (in absentia) in various domestic intelligence operations in 1961. 1

Two FBI documents declassified pursuant to the 1992 law reveal that Tullis, Jr., apparently was no stranger to the FBI files. The FBI concluded after talking with Tullis' father that "from elder Tullis remark re son having been questioned previously by authorities re narcotics in Japan and activities in Cuba, Tullis, Jr., appears identical with Richard Anthony Tullis, with alias, registration act, Bufile one hundred dash nine nine four two seven, New York file ninety seven dash one four six six. Incomplete WFO file shows Tullis, Jr., interviewed 1958, furnished info re Cuban activities."2 Interestingly enough, the file numbers above remain redacted in the declassified version of the FBI memo made available to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. 3

The ARRB responded to me shortly thereafter (fall of 1996) with a form letter indicating they had received my request.

After hearing nothing on the matter for some months, I again wrote the ARRB in May of 1997 to request a status report and to inquire as to whether the FBI liaison had been contacted regarding the potential importance of Tullis' files. Attachment 2. After receiving not even an acknowledgment of my second letter, I contacted the board again in September of 1997 and attempted to make it clear that I was becoming somewhat frustrated with the lack of a response. (Attachment 3). In response to this letter, I did receive a short reply from (future Executive Director) Laura Denk, Chief Analyst for FBI Records, indicating that the ARRB was considering looking into the matter. (Attachment 4).

Giving the ARRB the benefit of the doubt, I waited until May of 1998 (Attachment 5). to contact them for a fourth time. I sent carbon copies of the letter to some members of the Kansas Congressional delegation, and I sent personal copies of the letter addressed to Judge Tunheim and Tom Samoluk --- in addition to the generic version addressed only to the ARRB. In that letter, I regurgitated Tunheim's quote from his April 21, 1998 "open letter" regarding the board's activities:

"I would like to thank the members of the research community for their continued support over the years. We have always appreciated the input and suggestions you have provided to the Board. Frequent contact with members of the public has been an important component of our efforts."

As the summer of 1998 wore on and I had received no response whatsoever from anyone on the ARRB, I also became convinced that the interns and gophers on various staffs of the Kansas Congressional delegation to whom this matter had been forwarded were going to be of no help --- most of them frankly were still trying to figure out what the ARRB was.

I finally called the ARRB myself in July of 1998 and spoke to Ms. Denk. She told me that the Tullis matter was on a "Top 10" list of FBI related-issues that the ARRB might get to if they had the time prior to October 1, 1998. I told her that this was not acceptable, and that I regarded the ARRB's (lack of) effort on this matter over the prior two years as an abject failure. I told her that the FBI should have been contacted in the fall of 1996 regarding the files. She conceded that that was the way the ARRB was supposed to function pursuant to the 1992 law, but said that the reality had been far different. She said that the FBI had never really established a liaison or compliance officer in a timely matter. I asked why the ARRB could not simply forward my request to the FBI --- two full years after it had been in the ARRB's hands --- since Tullis' case files clearly fall under the definition of assassination-related records. She told me something like, "Well, it just doesn't work that way. We just haven't been able to initiate contact with the agencies on quite a number of things --- and the agencies have been stonewalling us on other issues, since they know that we will be going out of existence."

An interesting tale indeed, and one with perhaps even a ring of plausibility. But Denk's analysis seems to me to fly in the face of the ARRB's written reports:

"The Review Board has continued its efforts to locate additional FBI assassination records by making several requests for records and information. The FBI has assisted in this effort by giving Review Board members access to requested files. The FBI has, on the whole, been extremely cooperative and helpful to the Review Board and has provided the information requested." 4

"The Review Board formally submitted to the FBI more than 50 requests for additional records. In response to the Board's requests, the FBI made its original files available. In a limited number of instances, the Bureau provided documentation on those files that were destroyed according to the FBI's records retention schedule. The Review Board designated thousands of documents for assassination records processing as a result of these requests." 5

"In January 1997 and again in April 1998, the staff of the Review Board met with the FBI to address any outstanding matters with respect to the Bureau's compliance with the JFK Act. The compliance program with the FBI focused primarily on the scope of the FBI's searches under the JFK Act. The Review Board staff raised additional records issues..." 6

While this matter may well pale in comparison to some of the aforementioned public "successes" of the ARRB, I still have to wonder how many other similar requests were laying around as the ARRB turned out the lights on September 30. I want to note that Denk refused to speak with me during the final two weeks of the Board's existence, notwithstanding nine separate efforts --- via voice-mail, messages left with her secretary, and e-mail --- I made to contact her to inquire on the final disposition of the Tullis request and/or offer her the opportunity to see a draft of this article.

I also now have to ask again a couple of questions which I asked Samoluk in Dallas in November, 1997, and which I later asked Joe Backes (whom I regard an expert on federal declassification law) --- neither of whom seemed to have clear answers. What is to become of the public's ability to get its hands on assassination-related records now that the ARRB has sunset? What sorts of transitional mechanisms were contemplated by the 1992 law in the wake of the sunset? What about the Freedom of Information Act and other federal declassification efforts?

While these questions --- some of which are addressed in the ARRB's final report 7 --- are of an obvious narrow interest to me in light of my now stone-cold-dead request regarding some FBI case files, I think the answers may be of much broader and greater significance to the JFK assassination research community as we head into the post-ARRB era.

2. FBI 124-10008-10021, File 105-82555-179

3. HSCA 180-10031-10292, File 105-82555-179

4. February 1997 ARRB Report for FY 1996

5. ARRB Final Report, September 1998, Chapter 8 --- Compliance with the JFK Act by Government Offices

6. Ibid.

7. Recommendations in ARRB's Final Report include the following: (1) The ARRB indicates that its compliance program it developed with various federal agencies was "intended to be forward-looking, so that the agencies will continue to follow the provisions of the JFK Act after the Board terminates its role." (2) The ARRB recommends that NARA exercise the provisions of the law after the sunset with the assistance of an "oversight group" and an appeals process designed to "place the burden for preventing access on the agencies." (3) "Congress should ensure that NARA receives the additional resources necessary to manage {the JFK] collection responsibly, and that it is also be given (sic) the authority to administer the remaining provisions of the JFK Act." (4) "The Board recommends negotiation of a memorandum of understanding among NARA, the FBI, and the CIA that would establish a common agreement on how to resolve the inevitable issues concerning the extensive assassination records of these two agencies. This is particularly necessary since additional records will be sent to NARA and additional releases of documents are scheduled to take place after the termination of the Review Board." (5) That the FOIA be strengthened; and (6) That the federal government adopt a new uniform declassification policy.

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