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Note: There were supposed to be transparencies to go along with my presentation but I didn't have the time to make them. The documents are available from me at 10c a page. (See Fair Play main page, "The ARRB On Tape," for additional information.) --- JB
Well, there are a few items to bring to your attention. They are all important and I don't have time to go into great detail. I want to talk to you today about missing material that it supposed to be in Archives II having been opened in full by the ARRB; The Janet Veazy-Cooper film; some other Board business; and interesting items in some Secret Service records released in January '96.
First, please read all my analyses of the documents the ARRB has released on the Fair Play web site. In them you should note that there is plenty that is not released. There are not only pages and redactions aplenty in the documents voted to be released, then actually released, and transferred to Archives II but documents in their entirety that are not available to be copied. No RIF, no ARRB Formal Notice of Determination, no withdrawal sheet, which would be another issue if there was one, nothing.
Here are a few examples of what I am talking about.
Released in October 1995, reviewed in what I call the "5th Batch" in my Fair Play review is Document # 124-10035-10168. This is a 7 page cable from SAC Dallas to Director, FBI. It is dated January 25, 1964. For some reason pages 2-5 are missing.
Can you see the RIF? It clearly states there should be 7 pages. You can clearly see that there is a page one, then you go immediately to page 6, see on the top left, page 6, then the last page, page 7. So clearly pages are missing.
Document # 124-10076-10024 is an eight page report from SAC Dallas to Director, FBI. It is dated January 25, 1964. It is a copy of document # 124-10035-10168. It too has the same pages missing.
And again, Document # 124-10104-10238, same document, same missing pages.
Again, Document #124-10157-10384, same document, same missing pages.
Document # 124-10191-10089 is missing a page. It's supposed to be four. I have three. Actually it copies a two page report. Page one and three are the same. So just copy page two again to get your four pages. Or ask them. Maybe there is something on the fourth page.
Now in the CIA documents of this release, the released version have less than the redacted versions given out by the Board. These are the 44 CIA documents released October 26, 1995. Case in point, Document # 104-10004-10257 is a seven page report from the CIA to the FBI on the telephone intercept of Lee Harvey Oswald's calls to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The redacted version has all 7 pages of the document. The released one copied at Archives II is missing the last three pages.
Document # 104-10015-10067 is a two page report, in the redacted version the two pages were released, in the released version page two was not, though page two had no redactions.
Document # 104-10015-10082 is missing the first page of a two page document in the released version.
In what I call the 7th Batch Document # 104-10015-10190 is from JKB to CIA. It is dated 11/26/63. It is a 15 page report on Lee Harvey Oswald and Silvia Tirado De Duran. 14 pages of which are missing. The full report is attached and unredacted in the redacted version. Why is it not included in the released version available for copying at Archives II?
Document # 104-10105-10191 is a 6 page report from COS, Mexico City to Director, attn: Knight and Galbond. 5 pages of this report are missing. They are in the redacted version of the documents I got but not in what I copied at the Archives.
Document # 104-10015-100193 is a 9 page report. It is a telephone intercept transcript. 8 pages of which are missing in the released version yet were released in the redacted version.
Document # 104-10015-10198 is a two page cable from Mexico City to CIA. It is dated 11/27/63. One page is a record and routing sheet with Scott and White names stamped on them. The Cable reads, "1. COS was advised at 1215 Mexico time via Lic. Luis Echeverria, acting minister of Gobernacion, that Silvia Duran has been rearrested because she was attempting to leave Mexico for Cuba. 2. Request instructions." The Cable is not included in the released material at Archives II.
Document # 104-10015-10199 is a three page cable from Mexico City to Director, CIA. It is a translation of the call Armas returns to Dorticos. It is dated 11/27/63. The source is LIENVOY. LICRYPT has a copy. Tapes being saved. One page is a record and routing sheet. The other two pages are the cable. The second page of the cable is missing.
Document # 104-10015-10205 is a two page cable from CIA to Mexico City. It is dated 11/27/63. One page is a record and routing sheet. It has Scott and White names stamped on it. The cable itself is missing. The cable was completely unredacted in the redacted version of the document. Only Scott was redacted on the record and routing sheet.
Document # 104-10015-10209 is a two page cable from CIA to Mexico City. It is missing the record and routing sheet.
Document # 104-10015-10244 is a 7 page report from Winston M Scott to Director, CIA. It is dated 11/29/63. Pages 2-6 inclusive are missing. These missing pages were in the redacted version and completely unredacted.
Document # 104-10015-10249 is a 12 page report from Mexico City to Chief, WH Division. One page is a record and routing sheet. The second page is the Dispatch informing what is attached. The first page of the report is in the released material at Archives II. The rest is missing.
In the 8th batch released December '95 Document # 124-10018-10362 is a four page cable from SAC, Miami to Director and SACS, Dallas and San Antonio. Page two and four are missing.
Document # 124-10027-10059 is listed as a five page report from SAC, Boston to Director, FBI. This is a 5 page report with three pages missing. The report is on Priscilla Johnson.
Document # 124-10027-10395 is said to be a 9 page report. I have only two, they are the first page of the report and page three.
Document #124-10159-10393 is an eight page report from SAC Miami to the Director and SACS Dallas and San Antonio. It is a duplicate of Document # 124-10018-10362. As with Document # 124-10018-10362 page two and four of the report are missing. It is supposed to be two copies of the four page report.
Document # 124-10173-10250 is a two page teletype that is a duplicate of Document # 124-10027-10032. There appears to be a problem in that the RIF said two pages. So the second page is missing.
Document # 124-10178-10400 is supposed to be 11 pages it is only two. It is a duplicate of Document # 124-10018-10362. Pages 2, 4 and whatever else there was supposed to be to make eleven pages are missing.
In the CIA documents for the 8th release Document # 104-10015-10007 is a 21 page edited text of the Dorticos-Armas conversation. There are definitely pages missing here, not so much by the document and RIF. I believe they are correct. However, there are two systems of numbering the pages. Centered on the bottom of the first page is the number 32. This page seems to be a combination of two pages. A symbol list is given so we know who is talking, and below that is a rather small CIA official routing slip about the size of today's "post-it-notes". To the right is the number 10 and below that is the number 201-289248 which is Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 number. So we get pages 10-30 by that system and pages 32-52 the other way. What might have come before and after is unknown.
Document # 104-10017-10015 is missing. It is supposed to be open in full.
Most noticeable are the 198 HSCA documents that were supposed to be released in December of 1995. They are all missing!!
In what I call the 10th Batch, released January '96 in the FBI documents Document # 124-10003-10063 is a three page document. It is dated 03/03/64. It is from the SAC, Cleveland to Director, FBI. Page three is missing.
Document # 124-10018-10356 is a two page document dated 11/27/63. It is from the SAC in Los Angeles to Director, FBI. Page two is missing.
Document # 124-10027-10033 is a three page document dated 11/30/63. It is from SAC, Chicago to Director, FBI. This was shared with Dallas, Las Vegas, St. Louis, and San Antonio. Page two and three are missing.
Document # 124-10027-10232 is a two page document dated 02/05/65. The second page is missing.
Document # 124-10035-10116 is a 100 page document dated 12/02/63. 97 pages are missing.
Document # 124-10037-10125 is a 96 page document. It refers you to 105-82555-761. It is dated 12/02/63. It is basically another copy of document # 124-10035-10116. It is missing 93 pages.
Document # 124-10058-10009 is missing.
Document # 124-10058-10403 is a six page document dated 1/30/63. It refers you to FBI 62-109060-1407. It is from SAC Chicago to Director. 4 pages of which are missing.
Document # 124-10170-10009 is a 36 page report. It is dated 12/12/63. It is from Charles S. Harding to Director FBI. 34 pages are missing.
Document # 124-10170-10034 is a 25 page report dated 12/03/63. 22 pages are missing.
Document # 124-10170-10094 is a 34 page report from Charles S. Harding to Director, FBI. 32 pages are missing.
Document # 124-10087-10334 is missing.
Document #124-10239-10385 is missing.
Document #124-10275-10359 is missing.
Document # 124-10173-10008 is a duplicate of document # 124-10170-10034. Page two is missing.
Document # 124-10193-10067 is a three page report dated 12/04/63. Page two is missing.
Document # 124-10228-10416 is a 99 page document dated 12/02/63. It is from Leo E. Pedrotty to Director, FBI. This is a duplicate of document # 124-10035-10116. 96 pages are missing.
Document # 124-10243-10078 is a six page document dated 11/30/63. 4 pages are missing. It is a duplicate of document # 124-10027-10033.
Document # 124-10267-10400 is a three page document dated 11/30/63. It is from SAC Chicago to Director, FBI. Two pages are missing. It is a duplicate of Document # 124-10027-10033.
Document # 124-10270-10014 is a six page document dated 11/30/63. 4 pages are missing. It is a duplicate of document # 124-10027-10033.
Document # 124-10270-10190 is missing the ARRB Final Determination Notice. It is an eight page document dated 11/27/63. 4 pages are missing. It is a duplicate of document # 124-10018-10356.
Document #104-10015-10398 is missing.
Document # 180-10078-10384 is missing.
Document # 180-10080-10131 is missing.
Document # 180-10080-10231 is missing.
Document # 180-10109-10358 is missing.
Document # 180-10118-10038 is missing.
I need your help in getting this BIG problem addressed and taken seriously.
Next is the issue of the Veazy film. Let me recap for those of you who don't know what I went through trying to get this film. Basically, I saw as you did the Dan Rather exclusive. I first heard about this new film from my friend Dennis Karius in an email. There was some publicity given to this film in print media but Danny boy got the film. This was May 28, 1996. The ARRB was having an open meeting June 4th. I went to the Archives before the Board's open meeting, couldn't get the film, they said the didn't have it yet. The ARRB told me that they gave out copies of the film on May 28 after 7:00 p.m. I went into this in "Film Farce" on Fair Play. For some reason the Board made a secret deal with CBS so that Rather got the exclusive and that the ARRB would not give out copies until after Danny was on the air.
The Board will not really acknowledge this or admit this at all, nor are they commenting on Gaylord Communications claim of copyright on the film Janet Veazey donated to the Board.
I tried to get a copy of this film for use in a presentation I was giving in England. Tom Samoluk finally did send me a copy but only after a great deal of letters back and forth. The run around I got from the ARRB and the Archives dealt with the copyright claim, though still neither admits that. When I finally got back from England and opened the package, this was stuck on the video and these are the documents that came with it, and there was a request for $8 dollars, with this document requesting a signature. I naturally had some questions about this copyright claim. Well, Samoluk didn't want to hear it and demanded the $8 and threatened to blackmail me from further information from the Board until I send in the $8.
Well, I fought back on this. I sent a copy of all my correspondence with replies from the Board on this matter to my Congressman, my Senators, Congressional Oversight Committees and President Clinton.
I got letters of reply from Congressman McNulty and Senator D'Amato. First, my Congressman Michael McNulty wrote a reply back to me on September 19, 1996. Then I got a letter of reply from Senator D'Amato.
On November 1, 1996 I got a copy of the letter Marwell wrote to Congressman Michael McNulty. Marwell acknowledges that I have been in contact with them about 100 times and have testified to them twice at public hearings. He then lies.
"Mr. Backes' specific complaints in connection with the Review Board's acquisition of a film containing outtakes from KTVT are without merit. In this instance, he was extended a courtesy that no other member of the public received. Mr. Backes made a special plea for a copy of the film in connection with a presentation he was to make. The National Archives did not have the capability to respond quickly enough to meet his needs, and it was repeatedly explained to him that we did not have copies for distribution to the public. Nevertheless, to assist him, we sent him our file copy. Despite the courtesy extended to him, Mr. Backes initially refused to pay the Board the $8 (our cost to make each videotape copy) that media outlets who received a copy of the film were charged. Subsequently, he has provided payment to the Board and will continue to receive information that we disseminate to individuals on our mailing list.
"Finally, I understand that as public servants we are obligated to be responsive to members of the public, and the Board and staff have devoted significant resources to keep the public informed about our work. I am aware as well that we cannot satisfy everyone all of the time. It is, however, particularly disappointing when someone (to whom we have been particularly attentive and to whom we have extended a special courtesy) is unjustly critical of our efforts."
Now, none of the issues I raised are addressed. Nothing is said of Gaylord Communications claim of copyright. Nothing is said of the secret deal made with CBS. Nothing is said about giving out copies of the film to media representatives, when that was done or how. Nothing is said about not classifying me as a media representative, in violation of their own rules, despite the obvious fact that no one anywhere is doing more to inform the public about the ARRB than I am. Since they decided that I am not a "member of the media" that should disqualify me from having to pay the $8 dollars right there. But again I stress the issue was never the $8 it is and remains Gaylord Communications claim of copyright.
On November 13, 1996 I got a response back from Senator D'Amato. This came with a response not from the Review Board but from Archives II.
"We regret that Mr. Backes believes that he was not treated well by members of our staff. As to any conversation Mr. Backes had with staff in the Motion Picture Research Room, we are unable to establish with whom he had spoken and the context within which any statements Mr. Backes refers may have been made."
They almost make it sound like a denial that anyone talked to me while at the same time making it sound like they did an investigation to find out who did.
The letter goes to state, "Until we received a deed of gift from the donor, which provided the authority to make copies, NARA referred all requests for access to the film to the JFK Assassination Review Board. We understand that the Board provided copies of the footage to members of the media from May through late July." (emphasis added)
They were only giving out after 7:00 p.m. on May 28th according to what I was told.
The deed of gift was signed by John W. Carlin on July 27. Mr. Carlin states that as of early August the Archives can now supply copies of the film.
However, Mr. Steve Tilley told the Review Board a different story on availability of films. At the August 6th open meeting of the ARRB he stated that the reproduction of films has been privatized, "now researchers come in and deal with a series of vendors who are actually responsible for making the reproductions. So, once they determine what item it is they want to have copied, they are then put in touch with a group of vendors, allowed to negotiate with those vendors to get the best price that they can get, and then the vendor will then produce the reproduction needed, and send it to them." Still photograph reproduction is still apparently done at the Archives.
Now another issue of importance is that the Board is deciding that the records referred to as "the segregated collection", or "sequestered collection", these are documents the HSCA gathered from the CIA that deal with the assassination of President Kennedy. At the August 6th open meeting two representatives of the CIA, John Pereira, and Barry Harrelson were placed under oath, something the Board has never done before, to give testimony about the collection. The sequestered collection breaks down to about 192,000 pages of hard copy and 72 rolls of microfilm, which would be about 163,000 pages. So that's about 355,000 pages of material that the Board has to look at document by document. However, the Board doesn't really want to do that in the interest of time because that would take up too much of their time. So they are looking for a way to deal with this.
I would urge you to write to the Board and ask for the "Memorandum of Understanding" signed by the Chairman of the Assassination Committee and the Director of Intelligence that explains why these documents were sequestered. It is referred to on p. 25 of the August 6th open meeting transcript.
Now the CIA began its process of reviewing these documents under Director Gates's Historical Review Program. They wrote to Speaker Foley requesting approval to begin declassifying and releasing these records. Foley gave approval.
One of the troubling items in the hard copy are personnel files. The Board wants to set these records aside. There is even the possibility that the Board may decide that these records are not assassination records and will not release them, despite the fact that the HSCA requested this material from the CIA, looked at them, and asked that they be held separately, thus the name "segregated". This was discussed at length at the October 16th open meeting as well. This meeting was at the Board's Washington D.C. office in that little small room to the left once inside the security door. It was nearly overflowing with staff.
These records were referred to as having "no apparent relevance to the assassination". Jeremy Gunn explained that some of these records are "false hits", that is a personnel file was requested but the wrong file was sent, for example the HSCA wanted a file on Bob Smith but a file on a different Bob Smith was sent. On the other hand Ann Goodpasture's personnel file is in here. See Oswald and the CIA by John Newman for information of her.
Dr. Hall asked the question how do we know that something isn't relevant. This whole discussion with Gunn was done for the public. Dr. Hall stated it that way. This was fine with me. Dr. Hall took the position that because an official federal agency requested these files that automatically makes them assassination related. He wondered why the ARRB should be second guessing the HSCA.
Dr. Nelson remarked that the Board does not have the time to look into these records, determine relevancy, review document by document, word by word. This is the crux of the matter with these files.
They appeared to me to be creating a category to place these records in so that they can move onto records they have no problem with relevancy.
The staff of the Board saw three possible decisions with these files 1.) that they be transferred back to the agency of origin, 2.) preserved by the origin agency with Archive supervision or 3.) transferred to the Archive but kept separate from the records that are publicly accessible. The staff was urging that decision number one not be adopted.
So I don't think we will be seeing these materials until 2017.
Now, there are some Secret Service personnel in Chicago and elsewhere who are lying through their teeth about JFK's November 2, 1963 proposed, later canceled, trip.
What is most fascinating about all of these HSCA documents from this January release is that the ARRB Executive Director, Mr. David Marwell looked at all of them. How can I tell? Well, there is a charge out record document. I have never seen such a document before. Marwell's name is written in, the JFK Assassination Review Board, etc. Mr. Marwell looked at this material on September 19, 1995.
The Secret Service was lying to the HSCA people and being most uncooperative and the HSCA knew it. In regards to Agent Jamison and the Miami trip, in document #180-10074-10394 the HSCA interviewer in a most uncharacteristic move for a federal investigator into the JFK assassination confronts this "memory loss" of Mr. Jamison. "Questioning about the reasons for the deficiencies in his memory elicited various types of admissions. Some admissions represented Jamison's adoption of postures of ignorance, (emphasis added) e.g. 'All I know is that he (the President) was in safe and out safe.'" "Mr. Jamison experienced difficulty in recalling detailed information of any kind about conditions of any kind in the Miami office in 1963." The HSCA interviewer kept trying, "Under the conditions created by the virtually complete loss of memory on Jamison's part, questioning was developed which invited Jamison to comment on hypothetical protective situations." Specifically, he was asked to determine whether on November 18, 1963, if he had been exclusively in charge, would he have transported the President from the airport to the speech site at the hotel by helicopter or motorcade? Memorandum before him some written by Jamison himself made it clear that the threat on Nov. 18, 1963 was posed by a mobile, unidentified rifleman shooting from a window in a tall building with a high power rifle fitted with a scope. Jamison had "no recall" of these facts even with his own recollection was refreshed by his own memoranda.
On Chicago Trip
Document # 180-10078-10493. On the cancellation of the 11-2-63
Presidential visit to Chicago, "SA Kinney was assigned to drive the
Presidential follow-up car for the motorcade. His records show that he went
to Chicago, prepared for the trip and was awaiting the President's arrival.
At the last minute, the trip was canceled. SA Kinney's was informed that
the "Cuban missile crisis" necessitated the cancellation."
What the hell is this? Holy Halderman Batman! The Cuban missile crisis was in October of 1962. So what does this mean?
Document # 180-10082-10453 is a 3 page summary dated 02/01/78. It is a summary of an interview with James S. Griffiths. Griffiths stated that he started as an agent in August, 1961 in Chicago. At first Griffiths had no recall of a proposed Presidential visit on November 2, 1963. When refreshed about the information of President Kennedy attending a Army-Air Force game at Soldier's Field, he stated, "Isn't that the one that was canceled at the last moment?"
He stated that he was assigned to the airport for that proposed trip. The HSCA interviewers informed him that the work sheet showed that he was assigned to the airport and this is where he was when word came of the cancellation of the trip.
Griffiths stated that the name of Thomas Vallee was familiar and remembers a case concerning Vallee, but does not remember any of the details. He stated that he does not remember anything outstanding regarding a threat to the President for that particular visit. He stated that David Grant was the advance man for the Chicago trip.
Document # 180-10087-10191 is a seven page interview summary with Maurice Martineau.
The HSCA asked about threats to JFK in the Chicago area in November 1963. Martineau visibly stiffened. "I can recall no threat that was significant enough to cause me to recollect it at this time" he said. In contrast to the wealth of detail which flooded his earlier recollections, his answers became vague and less responsive.
Martineau explained that just prior to a Presidential visit, there would be a meeting of the office agents and detail assignments would be handed out. In the instance of the President's intended visit on November 2, 1963 Martineau did not recall any particular surveillance involving Cuban or Latin types, nor did he recall any all-night interrogation of any suspects in the Chicago office.
"All night interrogation"-? What is that about?
Martineau recalled nothing about the Mosley information until HSCA staff read a portion of a Secret Service memo (q.v.) written by SA Ed Tucker (and which Martineau signed as "Approved by") which outlined the SS 1963 interest in Mosley, whom it appears was an informant. He only recalled that Mosley was a "police buff, a James Bond type who knew where there was a stock of automatic weapons which some Cubans were trying to buy. "They were Chicago bus drivers....I don't know what happened in connection with the information and at no time do I recall talking to the FBI about it."
Document # 180-10093-10022 is a two page interview summary of Louis Sims.
Mr. Sims entered the Secret Service in April 1961 and was assigned to the Chicago field office until January 1964. Sims stated he was attending the Secret Service school at the time of the proposed Presidential visit to Chicago on November 2, 1963.
Sims stated that he could not remember the dates but he recalls that it could have been any time up to a year prior to the assassination, he was assigned to conduct a surveillance on a subject that was either Puerto Rican or Cuban. He does not remember any specific details other than it involved gun running and appeared to be a very sensitive investigation. He stated that the names Echevarria and Manuel Rodriquez were familiar; but he couldn't place them. Sims also stated that there may have been a grocery store involved in the surveillance.
Sims stated that he had no recall of any threat relative to the Presidential visit to Chicago in April 1963.
April? I thought they were interested in November 2, 1963.
Document # 1870-10099-10491 is an eight page summary report of an interview with SA William Greer.
Greer had no independent recollection of going to Chicago on November 2, 1963. He claimed his trip book would verify it and he has three books salted away in the attic and it was too much trouble at the time for him to go rooting around in a cold crawl space looking for them. He assured us he would xerox the material we needed and forward it to Washington.
In Chicago, he was scheduled to drive President Kennedy. He recalls the trip was canceled at the last minute but doesn't recall the particular reason.
The HSCA staff commented, "Like many people we have talked to about the Chicago trip, he confused the reason for JFK's previous trip cancellation, i.e. the Cuban Missile Crises, with the assassination of President Diem in Viet Nam."
Greer again requested time to look at this "trip book" for verification of his whereabouts on 11/2/63.
Document # 180-10104-10331 is a six page summary report of an interview with SA Joseph Noonan.
Noonan had participated in Presidential Protection duties in connection with the planned visit of President John F. Kennedy to Chicago on November 2, 1963.
Noonan had no direct involvement with the Vallee case. He was aware of the action taken by Agents Tucker and Strong which resulted in Vallee's arrest on 11/2/63 by the Chicago Police.
Noonan was involved in the Mosley case. Noonan explained that Mosley came to the attention of the Secret Service about a year or two prior to this incident. He came into the Chicago office and talked to acting SAIC Martineau about a counterfeiting case. Noonan recalls that SA Robert Motto worked undercover and was attempting to make a "buy". The surveillance led them to an alley on the North side of Chicago where a Mack Sennet scene ensued. Noonan said that unknown to him Mosley had a gun on his person. Several agents and Chicago detectives were covering. Noonan was looking in a side window of the garage where the "buy" was being discussed. One of the Chicago police spotted the gun on Mosley and shouted "look out he's got a gun." The police officer fired a shot and all hell broke loose. Noonan said he cocked his pistol and was about to fire when his scarf fluttered in the wind and caught between the trigger and the frame causing a misfire. He said he felt like a fool but was happy he didn't discharge the weapon because he might have shot agent Motto by mistake.
Wait, it gets better.
At about 2 a.m. in the morning a woman stuck her head out of the window and took their picture with a flash camera. She informed them that she knew who they were and was calling the police.
This incident did not sour Noonan on Mosley's status as an informant but made him aware of Mosley's sense of the theatre and he was wary in the subsequent encounter.
At or about the time of the Kennedy Assassination in Dallas on 11/22/63, Mosley again approached Martineau with information about some Cubans in Chicago who were looking to buy automatic weapons for use against Castro's Cuba. Asked why Secret Service was involved in gun-running, Noonan said that Mosley had informed them that the Cubans had made threats against the safety of the President, "which President?" he was asked. Specifically, President Johnson (which would put it after 11/22/63). Noonan explained that Mosley had told them that the Cubans said they were well financed and that "if Johnson got in their way in an attempt to invade their homeland he would be taken care of like Kennedy was," or words to that effect.
Again, SA Robert Motto was pressed into service and used undercover primarily to see if he could get the Cubans to articulate threats against the President. If in the process of making a buy he could audit their threats, then Secret Service would be on solid jurisdictional grounds.
Noonan said he and other agents were uneasy that the Cubans might have some ties to the Central Intelligence Agency and they called Assistant Chief Paul Paterni in Washington and asked him to check on this possibility. Paterni assured them shortly thereafter that it was all right to proceed with their investigation.
A little while later they received a call from Headquarters to drop everything on Mosley and Echevarria and to send all memos, files, and their notebooks to Washington and not to discuss the case with anyone. (emphasis added.)
Noonan describes circumstance in connection with the Mosley/Echevarria case which closely parallel circumstances writer Edwin Black described in his error-filled article in the 1975 "Chicago Independent" -(q.v) except that Black used the incidents he describes in an amalgam relating to threats against Kennedy in November 1963.
Noonan was in 1978 in charge of Intelligence operations for the Chicago office.
Document # 180-10104-10481 is a seven page summary of an interview with Gerald Behn.
Chicago
Mr. Behn was unable to recall anything about the President's
cancellation of his planned appearance on 11/2. He did not remember hearing
about either the trip or its political purpose. He did remember that SA
Dave Grant was the advance agent from the WHD to Chicago for the 11/1 trip.
Yet, he did remember that Maurice Martineau was the acting SAIC of the
Chicago office at the time of the trip. (Someone wrote in a question mark
after that.)
Document # 180-10105-10305 is a four page interview summary of Charlotte A. Klapowski, an employee of the Chicago Secret Service Field Office.
She had no recall of the proposed Presidential visit on November 2, 1963 or its cancellation. She had no recall of any threats or arrests relative to the proposed November 2nd visit. She had no recall about any threats during her twenty years in the Chicago office. She stated that she was not privy to this information as a clerk.
She had no recall on the name of Thomas Arthur Vallee or of doing any reports relative even though we (the HSCA investigators) have them in our possession. (I love that.)
Dallas
Document # 180-10071-10165. This is a four page document. It is a
summary of an interview of Secret Service Agent John David Ready.
In regards to the Dallas motorcade Ready stated that he was assigned to the right front running board of the presidential follow up car opposite Clint Hill. He stated that his job was not to watch the President but to watch the crowds and buildings. He stated that he had no specific recall of making any observation of the TSBD. He thought the first shot was a firecracker thrown from behind them. He said that the second and third shots were closer in time than the first and second shots. He heard someone say either, "He's hit," or, "He's shot," but doesn't remember when it was said, relative to the second or third shot.
Ready stated that he jumped off of the running board to go to the President's vehicle but was called back by Agent in Charge Emory Roberts. He had been watching the right side and was not aware of Clint Hill running to the presidential limousine.
After entering the hospital, he was assigned to the door leading to the area where they had taken the president. Ready did not have any recall of the FBI agent making a scene when trying to get into the room where the President was. He was told to ride the follow up car behind Vice President Johnson to Love field and as they were getting ready to leave he heard that the President had died. On arrival at Love field, Vice President Johnson boarded Air Force 1 along with the vice Presidential detail of Secret Service agents. Agent Ready boarded the back-up plane.
Rose asked Ready if he was aware of a trip ever being canceled because of a threat. He stated that he never performed Protective Service for any President or any other White House official who would have allowed a trip to be canceled because of a threat.
Document # 180-10074-10079. This is a five page document. It is a summary of an interview with Thomas Lem Johns.
In November 1963 Johns was at the LBJ ranch in Perdenales, Texas and was helicoptered with other agents to San Antonio to meet the Vice President's party. They traveled onto Dallas-Ft. Worth with the group. It was Johns' assignment on November 22nd to ride in the follow-up car. He normally rotated each day with Rufus Youngblood to ride in the Vice President's car. The follow-up was hard topped and the doors opened from the rear. "I was blind on top and couldn't see behind me," Johns said. "I heard two shots. They seemed close together. They were shots, not backfires, or firecrackers. Our car was moving very slowly and my door was open so I jumped out on the street. Before I could begin to move towards the VP's car I heard the third shot. The first two sounded like they were on the side of me towards the grassy knoll but then that's because of the confinement of the backseat and opening to that side plus the fact that people [were] falling to the ground on the grassy slope made me feel that the shots were from that direction. I never got a fix on the third shot because I was running towards LBJ's car, which was now some distance away from us and picking up speed. I was left on the street with no way to get back in our car. A passing car with White House photographers in it came by and one of them recognized me. He said, 'Hey, there's Lem Johns. let's give him a ride.' They stopped and picked me up and we drove to the Trade Mart, which was the next stop. I heard from a Dallas police officer that the President had been shot and taken to Parkland hospital. He drove me there on his three wheeler."
When Johns arrived at Parkland Hospital, he talked to Rufus Youngblood who told him to find Kenny O'Donnell and see what was happening with the President. He ran into Emory Roberts, another agent, who told him that the President was dead. He eventually brought O'Donnell to see Rufus and LBJ. "O'Donnell told the Vice President that Kennedy was dead and that they should take Air Force One and go back to Washington." Rufus (Youngblood) told him (Johns) to get transportation for Love Field and round up the Vice President's group. He (Youngblood) apparently gave the same task to other agents, because when Johns got back with the route information he saw that the others had taken LBJ and left. Johns left for Love Field himself, picking up Cecil Stoughton, the photographer, on the way.
Johns said that President Johnson talked to Bobby Kennedy on the phone and was told by Bobby to get sworn in there in Dallas. They then called Federal Judge Sarah Hughes who came and administered the oath. Johns helped remove seats for the coffin to be placed in the rear cabin of Air Force One. After they returned to Washington, Johns remained with the President's detail throughout the funeral.
Document # 180-10074-10396 is an eleven page summary of an interview with Winston G. Lawson. This is a copy of document # 180-10074-10397 with the notable exception of some handwritten notation to correct the text.
Now there is something damn odd here. Lawson stated that his pre-departure contact with PRS indicated that no reports were available from PRS about any threat subjects developed on the basis of President Kennedy's visit to Texas for the funeral of Representative Sam Rayburn in 1961.
Why would threat subjects be limited to developments from President Kennedy's attendance of Sam Rayburn's funeral? What this says in deceptive language is that there were no active threat subjects to President Kennedy in the whole state of Texas for two whole years, 1962 and 1963, at least in the Secret Service PRS files, and if there were they were not shared with Lawson. Lawson stated that he learned about the October 1963 attack in Dallas on Adlai Stevenson "only by his own reading."
Lawson recalled that he arrived at night in Dallas and was met by a local agent, then went to a local office, where meetings began for the purpose of planning the itinerary in light of manpower available and of threat levels. Constant meetings also began with the Dallas Police Department. Initially, however, the SS only paid a courtesy call and avoided making a specific early commitment about plans.
According to Lawson's Warren Commission testimony (IV p. 322), Lawson arrived in Dallas on Tuesday Nov. 12, 1963 at approximately 7:30 PM. He was accompanied by Jack Puterbaugh and Chief Warrant Officer Bales from the White House Communications Agency.
Mr. Lawson could not identify any person or persons as responsible for the decision to use a motorcade in Dallas, but he "thinks the decision was made in D.C." This is classic bull meant to confuse and disorient. Lawson knows better.
When asked whether there was controversy about the selection of the luncheon site he responded that the Secret Service "found what we found at the Fair Grounds, at the Trade Mart, and then phoned back."
Well, what the hell is that supposed to mean?
Lawson characterized the Trade Mart as "newer" as having "many more doors, a guard system, a card system for identifying visitors, and catwalks of the Hyatt House type with open balconies. The interviewer noted that Lawson did not describe the features of an alternative site and compare it to the Trade Mart.
In what appears to be a contradiction Lawson claimed that he could not identify any one person or organization as conspicuously preferring or trying to influence the selection of the Trade Mart, yet, on the same page states that Jack Puterbaugh, a civilian political advance man for the Democratic National Committee recommended the Trade Mart. Puterbaugh accompanied Lawson to Dallas, stayed at the same hotel as Lawson, attended many of the same DPD/SS planning meetings, and was also in charge of the protocol of the motorcade, the arranging of the seating and vehicle sequence for Congressmen and other dignitaries in the motorcade. This is total crap. Puterbaugh was sent down by Kennedy people to help Bruno but had no power whatsoever. this is a classic whitewash of Connally's manipulations to get the Trade Mart selected for the luncheon.
Lawson in this interview stated that he did not accompany Mr. Sorrels on the tour of the route which they each say that they made together on November 14. Second, Mr. Lawson stated that he "does not recall" that the route traveled by Sorrells included Dealey Plaza, since it was not certain on the 14th that the Trade Mart would be the destination.
Here's what Mr. Lawson said in CE 769, p. 2 in volume 17 p. 619, "SAIC Sorrells and I drove one of the proposed routes from the airport to the Trade Mart at the approximate speed probably to be taken during the motorcade, and looked over other security factors along the route."
So Lawson lied. Lie one, he did not drive with Sorrells; lie two, okay he didn't drive the motorcade route President Kennedy took on Nov. 22, he said he took "one of the proposed routes" but the HSCA did ask him that, and h e did too drive to the Trade Mart on one of the proposed routes with Sorrells, his own memorandum says he did. And what were the other proposed routes, and what was the destination of these other routes?
On Nov. 18 the route had been selected, a tour of the route was taken by Lawson Sorrells, and DPD Assistant Chiefs Batchelor and Lumpkin. Discussions were on "crowd" control, and an interest in "filing in the gap" of time between the landing of AF-1 at Love Field and the time of the speech, and a "prime concern with things falling from overpasses". Mr. Lawson also went to a private club in the late afternoon of the 18th. Lawson commented that Puterbaugh was in contact with Washington at this time and was (1) "probably" "getting instructions" "from the Democratic Party" on resolving matters of protocol at the local level; and (2) was "possibly" getting instructions on this matter from Betty Harris (Elizabeth Fosling Harris) who was Puterbaugh's primary local contact.
The discussions were on limiting the crowd by not publicizing the route. Connally did not want JFK to be popular, that would help the liberals whom Connally despised. The gap that needed to be filled was when Connally first offered and later confirmed that Texas Christian University would give JFK an honorary degree, then Connally had it pulled. I doubt if TCU was ever really going to give JFK a degree, although I am certain that Connally said they would to Jerry Bruno. Had this degree ceremony happened there would be no Dallas motorcade as there wasn't time for it.
Betty Harris was working with Bill Moyers, not Puterbaugh, in getting the route publicized prior to the motorcade. Moyers was not going to tolerate Connally's bullshit.
Stevenson exhibit No. 5053, 21H 562 at p. 570 indicates that a plan to include a DPD squad car in the motorcade behind the Vice President's car was changed by Lawson at a DPD-SS meeting on the 21st. Lawson was asked why there is no mention of this in his preliminary report of Nov. 19. Lawson stated that "the DPD could have put it in on their own" and that he could "not recall who took it out". Lawson added "it would have been listed if it had been scheduled", that he is "not sure it was scheduled to be there", and that he "doesn't know who canceled the DPD car because he doesn't know who decided to include it." As for the meeting on Nov. 21 he said that "maybe it (the matter of the squad car) came up."
The Stevenson report also states that Lawson changed a plan to have the JFK motorcycles parallel to the JFK limousine and instead decided to deploy the JFK motorcycles parallel to the rear fender. In this interview Lawson said he had "no recall of changing plans."
Maybe he (Lawson) didn't change them. Maybe someone else did and falsified the report. But somebody sure did change the placement of the motorcycles and the placement of other vehicles in the motorcade.
Even the HSCA saw through this. A comparison of CE 767 (Lawson's Preliminary Report) and CE 768 (Lawson's Final Report) show "that the intended sequence of vehicles on 11/19 was changed." In the actual motorcade of 11/22 as described in CE 768 Congressional Car #1 was placed immediately behind the SS Vice-Presidential Follow-Up Car rather than in its original position as the fifth car behind Vice Presidential Follow-Up.
Mr. Lawson was unable to explain the change except to say that he is "not sure that 768 is what it (the vehicle sequence) was." He is unsure of the accuracy of his own report!!!!!!
Another weird sentence, "As for the on site (Love Field) formation of the motorcade, Mr. Lawson said that he is not sure whether the deployment of the wire service car and press cars was done by the "local press man" in charge of press cars or by Mr. Lawson." Why is Mr. Lawson referring to himself, in the third person, as Mr. Lawson? Is he hanging out with Bob Dole? Or was someone else's name supposed to be here?
Lawson was also unable to remember whether the local press man in charge was Felix McKnight, Sam Bloom, or a White House press man.
So the implication is that some unknown person is changing the line up of vehicles in the motorcade, it could be one of several people, and no one thought it was odd, or a breach of security to do so.
Lawson acknowledged that Lt. Col George Whitmeyer who was part of the Dallas district U.S. Army Command, whom Lawson said "taught Army Intelligence" and who rode in the pilot car, "wasn't scheduled" to be in the motorcade. Mr. Lawson denied that the presence of Col. Whitmeyer had anything to do with Lawson's prior service in the CIC.
Lawson stated that in 1963 he had nothing to do with the CIC and that he has attended no inactive USAR meetings since March, 1958. Well, did he attend any active meetings?
During the Dallas Advance, Lawson had contact with an Air Force advance team and with Chief Officer Bales of the White House Communications.
Who was in this Air Force advance team and when did Lawson meet with them?
Document # 180-10078-10493 is an eight page summary interview with Samuel A. Kinney. I found this to be an amazing document.
"SA Kinney worked the November 17 Presidential visit to Tampa, Florida, then traveled to San Antonio, Texas, to prepare for the President's first stop in the visit to Texas scheduled for November 21-22. After President Kennedy's departure from San Antonio, Kinney proceeded to Dallas on November 21.
"As follow up car driver, SA Kinney had supervisory responsibility for the follow-up vehicles, two 1956 Cadillacs specially fitted out with running boards and other equipment. He remarked that the same car used in Tampa was used in Dallas, but that he did not know whether that car was also used in Miami for the visit of November 18."
Kinney stated that "there were "many occasions" when problems with the Presidential car required that the follow up cars be used as Presidential vehicles. The car in which the President was assassinated was ultimately sent back to the factory (Ford Motor Company) for preservation and display as an historical exhibit.
"SA Kinney stated that the SS agent most responsible for security planning was White House Detail Advance Agent Winston G. Lawson. He recalled that Lawson was working with photographs of possible threat subjects, was concerned about a threat poster printed with the slogan "JFK- Wanted Dead or Alive," and was "working around the clock".
Kinney thought that he was responsible for whether or not the bubbletop was used. Kinney was, "of the opinion that if he had put it on at Love Field, it would have been taken off during the motorcade."
Wonder what he meant by that?
"The follow-up car was interconnected by radio to the Presidential limousine. The radio link was manned by SA Emory Roberts in the front row passenger seat. In addition, four agents rode the running boards, two on each side. In Dallas, Presidential Appointments Secretary Ken O'Donnell and Aide Dave Powers would not have been included in the follow-up car if security planning had been solely the responsibility of SA Kinney. However, since O'Donnell and Powers were stationed well in board, neither one of them in any way affected the operation of the follow up car.
"SA Kinney stated that he was in charge of placing the news media vehicles (Ford Convertibles) in sequence behind the follow-up car. SA Kinney volunteered for this duty because it was "unusual for LBJ to be along" and he felt that his assistance might be useful. He was unable to recall any unusual or suspicious events that took place during this process. He recalled that he had no conversation with advance agent Lawson about the selection of specific vehicles for placement in the sequence.
"SA Kinney immediately recognized the first sound as that of gunfire, realizing that it was a "shot from over our right shoulder" which hit the President in the throat. The President, his movement (in Kinney's opinion) affected by the brace he wore, fell toward Jackie, who, "after catching him, set him back up." Kinney commented on Mrs. Kennedy's influence on the position of the President by remarking that the SS preferred not to have persons riding in jumpseats with the President. The writer understood this remark to mean that the President might have had room to be pushed to the floor.
"While Jackie was setting him back up, Connally turns rights, then left, then pow, pow. The second shot" (hit Connally and) "left Connally's back open." "The third shot hit the President." As the third shot landed, SA Kinney was able to see "hair coming up". At this point he hit the siren on the follow up car.
"Immediately after SA Kinney hit the siren, portside forward running board SA Clinton Hill said "I'm hitting it" (e.g. announced that he would make a break on foot for the presidential limousine). SA Kinney acknowledged this by lining up the left front side of his follow up car so that that side of the follow up car would offer the shortest, most direct path to the Presidential limousine. SA Kinney stated that at no time after Hill left the follow-up car did Kinney himself see Mrs. Kennedy "come out" (i.e. over the back seat onto the rear of the limousine); "if she had come out, I'd have hit her."
"During the period of time beginning when SA Hill reached the Presidential limousine and ending with the acceleration of the Presidential limousine, forward starboard running board SA John Ready announced to SA Kinney and Mr. Roberts that he was "going to go" i.e., to run for the Presidential limousine. Roberts ordered him to "stay aboard." Mr. Kinney's analysis of Robert's order was that if Roberts had permitted Ready to go, and "if Ready had done what Hill did, I've got one of them," i.e, because of the impossibility of swerving away at an angle wide enough to avoid both of them.
"SA Kinney stated that he "(didn't) think they (the people in the Presidential limousine) knew what was happening. they had no control." He also remarked that when Greer (the driver of the Presidential limousine) looked back, his foot must have come off the accelerator." N.B.: On the question of the rate of movement (if any) of the Presidential limousine during the assassination, SA Kinney observed that at the time of the first shot, the speed of the motorcade was "3 to 5 miles an hour".
"SA Kinney indicated that at the moment when the Presidential vehicle began to accelerate, "it went up to 80-85 m.p.h.", even though "I didn't know Parkland from the man in the moon". Upon arrival at the hospital, he "pulled in" in such a manner as to "block off" the Presidential limousine. It was his impression at the time that "the news media didn't see what happened (in Dealey Plaza) and did not get a story."
"At the hospital, SA Roberts, who was in command of Vice Presidential protection, noticed a "thumbs-down" signal flashed by SA Hill at the arriving Vice Presidential detail. Roberts understood this to mean that President Kennedy was dead, and accordingly he ordered the other agents in the detail to "surround and protect" the Vice-President and to "get him to stay back."
"Since SA Hill and SA Kinney had not been assigned a post at Parkland, they improvised their roles. SA Kinney "Bailed out and Clint (Hill) went to the left side of the car (presidential), I to the right." There they found "Jackie huddled over JFK who was slumped over" and whose "feet were locked under the jump seat." SA Hill and SA Kinney were unable "to get Jackie to let loose of JFK." The press had not arrived yet. SA Hill then said to Mrs. Kennedy "Jackie, we got to get him out" and he raised her up. When the President first came into view, SA Kinney believed that he observed the President's "right eye on his chin."
"The two agents began to wrap SA Hill's coat around the President. At this point, SA Kinney "lost control" and for a brief moment ceased assisting in caring for the president: "Someone else wrapped him up by the feet." By this time the press had arrived. "In the vicinity of the Presidential vehicle". Captain Cecil Stoughton gave orders that there were to be no pictures.
"SA Kinney soon returned to Vice-Presidential duties. "LBJ was in shock when the SS grapped him." As a driver, Kinney concentrated on the condition of his vehicle and on events taking place near it. He recalled that "someone wanted to wash the (Presidential) car. I said no one touch. A Dallas Police Department Officer and I put the bubble top back on the car and enclosed it by its snaps. Then pictures were taken of the roses, but not of the Presidential limousine. After the buttoning on of the bubble-top, I told Kellerman (SA Roy Kellerman, no. 2 SA in the White house Detail) that I'd take the cars back to Love Field and wait. I asked for two motorcycles escorts. I told Major Nedbal of the Air Force that I was coming and to have the ramp down on the vehicle transport aircraft. We then flew back to D.C."
"Inside the aircraft during flight, the loading sergeant, who had been in the rear compartment where the cars were stored, entered the forward cabin and said, "I can't stand to be back there." SA Kinney gave him his seat and returned to the rear compartment. At this point he discovered in the Presidential limousine a skull fragment under the jump seat where Connally had been seated, and a bullet fragment in the front seat between the driver's and passenger's seat. He remarked that the bullet fragment "Looked like it had hit the windshield frame above the windshield."
"SA Kinney put on a radio patch to Presidential Physician Admiral Burkley to inform him that he had discovered the skull fragment. Chief Petty Officer Tommy Mills, an aide to Burkley, received the message. SA Kinney then announced that he was going to go directly to the White house non-stop. The Washington field Office learned of this and sent 6 to 7 Park Police to escort SA Kinney to the White House Garage. In the garage they were met by FBI agents."
"SA Kinney finds the view of conspiracy plausible for two reasons.
"First, the view of the Presidential limousine that presented itself from the vantage point of the alleged sniper's nest is consistent with careful planning. From that vantage point, tracking the target through a scope did not require a side-to-side movement but required the use of vertical movement in order to track for distance. SA Kinney stated that tracking for distance is much easier than tracking from side to side. He also indicated that the sequencing of the shots -- one before the sign, once after -- suggested that the sniper was familiar with the scene.
"Second, SA Kinney reported that on the day of the assassination, SA Stuart Stout of the four-to-twelve shift was driving into Dallas to man a post at the Trade Mart in time for the President's arrival at the Mart. Stout was passed by a car leaving Dallas at a speed of 110 m.p.h. Stout remarked that "that car must have robbed a bank." SA William Duncan, who was on the same shift had given notice that it was five minutes away from the Mart. Duncan's story places the appearance of the speeding car at approximately 12:30 P.M."
Document # 180-10082-10452 is a four page summary dated 1/30/78. It is an interview with Glenn Bennett.
Bennet stated that he was detailed from PRS to the White House detail for the Dallas trip. This was because there was a manpower pull for the Dallas trip.
Bennet then gives his impression of the assassination. "He remembers hearing what he hoped was a firecracker. He then heard another noise and saw what appeared to be a nick in the back of President Kennedy's coat below the shoulder. He thought the President had been hit in the back. Bennett stated that he does not recall any agents reacting before the third shot. He believes Agent Ready started to react but was stopped by Emory Roberts, because the limousine had accelerated and Ready might have been injured.
Bennett helped unload the coffin and place it on the plane. He said he came back to the White House via helicopter.
Document # 180-10082-10454 is a 6 page summary dated 01/31/78. It is a summary of an interview with William "Tim" McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre was assigned to Presidential protection on the 8-4 shift for the Dallas trip. He stated his function on presidential protection was to be alert for any kind of trouble such as missile or objects being thrown, people running to the President's car and also ramming incidents.
McIntyre's assignment was the left rear running board of the Presidential running board of the Presidential limousine, behind Clint Hill.
McIntyre heard the first report, which he described as "very loud". He said that he had no doubt that it was a shot. There was a pause and then two more shots in succession.
McIntyre remembers an FBI agent over reacting at Parkland Hospital, trying to get into the operating room. McIntyre stated that he has no recall of the Agent's Commission (ID) books being called in and new ones being issued.
McIntyre remembers as a later date Agent Dick Johnson didn't say which stretcher but McIntyre got the impression it was from the President's stretcher.
McIntyre, when asked if any Secret service men had stayed behind in Dealey Plaza, he stated that he had heard that Agent Lem Johns, assigned to the Vice president, had left his car and was left behind, but made his way to Parkland Hospital.
Document # 1870-10099-10491 is an eight page summary report of an interview with SA William Greer.
There is then an interesting deletion of a document that is supposed to be open in full, "In regard to the Miami trip of November 18, 1963 Greer says he was in Palm Beach with the President and went to , then to Miami." That's exactly how it appears. Whatever was after the word "to" has been whited out. It is a four or five letter word, a name of a place judging by the sentence.
Greer said SS 100 X, the President's car, was specially designed for the Chief Executive. It had a seat in back which could elevate 8 1/2"x9".
Greer does not know if it was elevated in Dallas.
On November 22, 1963, William Greer got up around 6:00 a.m. having gotten to bed at midnight on the 21st. He had breakfast and went down to the place where the cars were being guarded. SS 100x was en route to Dallas by plane so in Ft. Worth he drove a leased Lincoln. There was talk about putting the bubbletop on. (N.B. We have excellent pictures of the bubbletop, both in sections and on the President's vehicle which we obtained from former SA Sam Kinney in Palm Springs, Florida.) but it was decided that since the weather was improving, not to do so. Greer says that Kenny O'Donnell made the final decision. He reminded us too that the trip was political and the President loved exposure to crowds.
Greer recalled that he flew from Ft. Worth to Dallas in air force #1 with the President's party. After the arrival of Dallas' Love field he readied the car for the motorcade. Agent Roy Kellerman who was Assistant Special Agent in charge of the White House Detail rode in the front seat with Greer. His function was personal protection of the President and manning the short wave radio, which was set on a channel equivalent to Dallas Police Channel #2. There was no window separating the front and back seats of SS 100x, but Greer said because of the crowd and motorcycle noise he could not hear conversation in the back seat between the Kennedy's and the Connally's.
He drove at speeds which ranged from ten to thirty miles an hour although when he made the turn into Elm Street from Houston his speed was slowed to about three to five miles per hour. "We were almost stopped," Greer said. He recalls approaching an overpass on a downhill run. He was attentive to overpasses, especially when people were on them. He vaguely recalls that there were people on this overpass and he was concentrating on them when the first shot came. The first shot sounded to him like a backfire. he did not react to it. After the second shot he turned to his right and saw blood on Governor Connally's shirt. At the same moment he heard Kellerman say, "We're hit. Let's get out of here," or words to that effect. He said he immediately accelerated and followed the pilot car to Parkland hospital. He was unaware that Clint Hill had jumped from the follow-up car to his vehicle. He says he doesn't even recall looking in the mirror 'til they got to the hospital. Kellerman was talking on the radio to the Squad car and others.
At this point Greer got out and assisted Kellerman and others in removing Governor Connally and President Kennedy to stretchers into Parkland Emergency. [The document says "Agent Eliot Hill", this must surely be an error of some kind. Surely they are talking of Clint Hill. I will again correct it] Agent Clint Hill had covered the President's head with his coat so Greer did not see the massive head wound nor the one in the throat. He guarded the door of the emergency room. He recalls embracing Mrs. Kennedy and saying something about wishing he could have been more evasive or avoided the tragedy. She reassured him with some kind words. It was an emotional scene.
Asked if he noticed the Texas School Book Depository, Greer said he watched people, not buildings. He would note, for example, a person on the street with his hand in his pocket. When they got to Houston from Main Street, he felt relieved. He felt that they were in the clear, the crowds were thinning and while he didn't relax, he did begin to feel relieved just before the shots came. Greer does not recall the third and final shot. He heard nothing from the back of the car; his mind shut it out and he concentrating on driving at a high rate of speed to Parkland Hospital. He had to weave in and out of other freeway traffic on the way.
At Parkland he recalls that his function was to guard the Emergency Room and keep intruders out. Some press were putting on white coats and trying to get in. Greer does not recall the incident about an unidentified FBI agent trying to get into the emergency room. He said this might have occurred when he was temporarily relieved.
When the doctors pronounced President Kennedy dead Greer was handed the President's clothing, wallet and watch, which he took back to Washington. He directed agent Rybka at Andrews Air Force Base to put the shopping bag in his locker at the White House. A few days later he returned Kennedy's watch and wallet to Ken O'Donnell.
Mrs. Kennedy asked Greer and Kellerman if they would drive the ambulance to Bethesda Naval hospital for the autopsy.
Greer recalls going into the autopsy with Kellerman. He described the scene for the writers but was not aware of the identities of all of the people there. He did remember Dr. Burkley and General McHugh. He remembers the two FBI agents Sibert and O'Neill and their acquisition of the fragments from President Kennedy's head.
Greer recalls Kellerman going to a telephone and talking to someone about a bullet found in Dallas. The doctors turned Kennedy over and found the bullet hole in his shoulder. He indicated a point on his right shoulder which approximated the spot. He said one of the doctors inserted a metal probe in Kennedy's back, which only went in a short way.
Greer says he asked the doctor if the bullet in [the] back could have worked itself out during heart massage. The doctors continued to take X-rays, looking for lead, but they couldn't find where the bullet went.
Greer said that after the autopsy he and Kellerman drove the body back to the White House.
Greer later talked to Governor Connally, who incidentally thanked him for saving his life. Connally told Greer that he distinctly recalled three shots (Greer says he never heard the third shot) and Connally further stated that he was shot with a separate bullet from President Kennedy.
Greer went home at 4:00 a.m. on November 23rd. He was asleep at 8:00 a.m. when the White House called. They wanted the St. Christopher medal which was in President Kennedy's wallet now in Greer's possession to place in the coffin. He dressed and went to the White House and gave the medal and wallet to Kenny O'Donnell. He attended a brief family service. He returned home to get more rest because he was scheduled to drive President Johnson. He drove Johnson to the Capitol and on the following day to the funeral.
Greer saw Gerald Behn, head of the White House Detail and submitted a signed copy of a report on his activities in Dallas on 11/22/63 to the White House Detail.
Greer was asked why Behn did not make the trip, he said he didn't know why. It was never discussed in his presence.
Belford V. Lawson wrote an addendum, "I distinctly remember reacting with shock and surprise when Mr. Greer stated to both Mr. Kelly and myself that, in the case of the President's visit to Dallas on November 22, 1963, he had no prior knowledge whatsoever of the path of the motorcade route or of any conditions on and surrounding the route that might affect his driving. He simply entered the Presidential limousine and followed the car in front of him."
Document # 180-10104-10481 is a seven page summary of an interview with Gerald Behn.
Dallas
Mr. Behn recalled controversy over alternative speech sites arising
between (1) Jerry Bruno, the President's civilian political advance man, (2)
Winston Lawson, the WHD advance agent in Dallas, and (3) Ken O'Donnell, White
House Appointments Secretary.
Well, as we should all know the conflict was not among these people but these people versus John Connally.
Behn was unable to recall discussing the selection of the speech site during an 11/5 meeting with Bruno. He was able to recall that Bruno had been in Texas for two or three weeks before the trip plans were resolved. Behn's recollection was not refreshed by the information that Bruno preferred the Women's Building because it was easier (than the Trade Mart to secure against acts of harassment directed against the President and because its large size permitted the admission of a diverse democratic Kennedy following for which there was no room at the mart. Note that Bruno has written in his book Advanc e Man that he had at one time obtained Behn's assent to the selection of the speech site.
However, Mr. Behn did recall that he discussed speech site selection with Lawson who ventured the opinion that in matters of security there would not be much difference between the Women's building and the Mart. Mr. Behn said that he reported Lawson's opinion to Mr. O'Donnell.
According to Mr. Behn, Ken O'Donnell was the person who made the final decision to go to the Mart. This decision came after a long period of uncertainty about whether to make the trip at all, given the political conflicts of Texas between liberal and conservative Democrats. Mr. Behn was unable to recall that the White House sent Bill Moyers to Texas to work on the problem. Behn did recall that O'Donnell announced a decision favoring the Mart. Behn stated that the announcement was made between the 5th and 9th of November. Behn concluded by saying that Lawson went down to Dallas 3 or 4 days after O'Donnell made the announcement. It is not clear as yet whether Lawson was told to go to the mart prior to departing for Dallas.
The Assassination
Mr. Behn was in Washington at the time of the assassination. He
described the communication system linking Washington with Dallas as follows:
WHD-HQ was in touch with the ongoing motorcade through the Dallas switchboard of the Signal Corps, whose warrant officers carried the necessary codes. Any message from WHD-HQ to the motorcade per se had to be relayed through the Corps switchboard; however, the motorcade agents were able directly to contact WHD-HQ.
After the shooting, SA Roy Kellerman called from a telephone at Parkland Hospital and stated that "JFK was shot" and that "it didn't look too good." The phone connection remained open until after the President left Parkland.
As for the evidence of the crime which was brought back from Dallas, Mr. Behn stated that he was in the chain of custody of CE 399, the bullet found on what was allegedly the Presidential stretcher, by SA Richard Johnsen. Behn received the bullet from Johnsen, then turned it over to the FBI.
On the evening of 11/22 Mr. Behn went with President Johnson to Spring Valley and then went home to get some sleep, and returning to Spring Valley on 11/23. he did not see Kellerman, Greer, or Hill until far later. Mr. Behn recalled that the film and X-rays of the autopsy were sent over to PRS at the Executive Office Building.
Mr. Behn was not able to recall any disciplinary action taken against any SS agent, nor could he recall that an in-house investigation was undertaken by the SS. He acknowledged that the writing of reports filed by each SS agent about his 11/21-2 activities was not normal procedure, but did not remember whether the agents were prompted to get them to accelerate their completion of the reports. He did not remember that the Dillon Committee resulted in 1964-65 in any changes in SS operations.
Accompanying documents
(5th-6th Batch)
1.) Document # 124-10035-10168
2.) Document # 124-10076-10024, same document, same missing pages.
3.) Document # 124-10104-10238, same document, same missing pages.
4.) Document #124-10157-10384, same document, same missing pages.
5.) Document # 124-10191-10089
(5th Batch)
6.) Document # 104-10004-10257
7.) Document # 104-10015-10067
8.) Document # 104-10015-10082
(7th Batch)
9.) Document # 104-10015-10190
10.) Document # 104-10015-10191
11.) Document # 104-10015-10193
12.) Document # 104-10015-10198
13.) Document # 104-10015-10199
14.) Document # 104-10015-10205
15.) Document # 104-10015-10209
16.) Document # 104-10015-10244
17.) Document # 104-10015-10249
(8th Batch)
18.) Document # 124-10018-10362
19.) Document # 124-10027-10059
20.) Document # 124-10027-10395
21.) Document #124-10159-10393, dup of Document # 124-10018-10362
22.) Document # 124-10173-10250
23.) Document # 124-10178-10400, dup of Document # 124-10018-10362
24.) Document # 104-10015-10007
(10th Batch)
26.) Document # 124-10003-10063
27.) Document # 124-10018-10356
28.) Document # 124-10027-10033
29.) Document # 124-10027-10232
30.) Document # 124-10035-10116
31.) Document # 124-10037-10125, a dup of Document # 124-10035-10116
32.) Document # 124-10058-10403
33.) Document # 124-10170-10009
34.) Document # 124-10170-10034
35.) Document # 124-10170-10094
(Secret Service records)
1.) Document # 180-10071-10165
2.) Document # 180-10074-10079.
3.) Document # 180-10074-10394
4.) Document # 180-10074-10396
5.) Document # 180-10074-10397
6.) Document # 180-10078-10493
7.) Document # 180-10082-10452
8.) Document # 180-10082-10453
9.) Document # 180-10082-10454
10.) Document # 180-10083-10419
11.) Document # 180-10087-10136
12.) Document # 180-10087-10137
13.) Document # 180-10087-10138
14.) Document # 180-10093-10022
15.) Document # 1870-10099-10491
16.) Document # 180-10104-10331
17.) Document # 180-10104-10481
18.) Document # 180-10105-10305
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