Gedanken 'bout Lee in M.C.

A Model of Mexico City

Joe Riley, 1994

Most of Lee Oswald's short career as enigma extraodinaire can be explained depending on one's preconceptions: an idiosyncratic leftist who defected and became disillusioned by the Soviet system; a follower of Fidel who finally lost his grasp and went bonkers; or, perhaps, an agent provocateur. Without arguing which view is more likely, both interpretations are rational. Both make some sense. What stands out about the events in Mexico City is that they don't seem to make sense by any interpretation. Literally, from beginning to end, there are some odd things about this trip.

At first glance, the trip seems so strange that perhaps it is nothing more than an oddball doing something strange, as oddballs do from time to time. This doesn't hold up very well. The problem is not just explaining Oswald. How does one explain the odd behavior of the CIA at the time of the trip or the behavior of the CIA, FBI, or Warren Commission after the assassination. There's no doubt about it now: the CIA both lied and distorted what it knew about the trip. Why they lied is debatable; that they did it is not. We know now that the FBI did not do a serious investigation of Mexico City; the FBI's own supervisor of the investigation in Mexico City remains disturbed by the superficial nature of that investigation. We know now that the Warren Commission had information it did not report---both Coleman and Slawson heard recordings of "Oswald's" calls. Since there are many reasons to doubt that it was really Oswald talking, why wasn't a voice analysis done? Or was it done? The answers to date are so lame as to be insulting. If it was Oswald on those recordings, are we expected to believe that would not have been put on the record (so to speak)? Perhaps not in the Report in order to preserve CIA "sources and methods", but not on the record, somewhere? Even more disturbing -- and to my knowledge there is no response by Coleman or Slawson---why did they say nothing when the HSCA was trying to figure out if recordings had been preserved? It gets worse, but let's not get lost, not yet anyway.

The goal of this paper is to explore possible interpretations of what went on in Mexico City. It's nothing so silly as a claim to a final solution. Its goal is quite limited: do the events in Mexico City have a rational interpretation as part of a conspiracy to kill John Kennedy? The goal is to create a model, not a theory. Without getting bogged down in scientific jargon, there is a big difference between a theory and a model. A theory makes a statement about what is true; it should be, as much as possible, free from bias or preconceptions. A model simply attempts to account for the data. In short, is a rational interpretation of the events in Mexico City possible?

Let's begin with the assumptions and biases. Let's be honest. What we want is a reasonable explanation of Mexico City consistent with a set of preconceptions about Oswald and the assassination. We can describe these in rough form as follows:

  1. The assassination was a conspiracy and the CIA was actively involved in that conspiracy.

  2. One element of that conspiracy (at least as it was carried out) involved using Lee Oswald.

  3. Oswald was, in some manner, an "agent" of an intelligence agency (possibly more than one).

  4. Oswald was under control, observation, or direction at the time of the trip.

  5. Any "mission" for Oswald would have to have a reasonable "cover story".

  6. Oswald's pending role in the assassination made him too important to be used; the dangers were too great. This requires some elaboration.

Stripped to essentials: The Mexico City scenario was an operation in direct support of assassination conspiracy carried out under cover of a routine provocation; the main purpose of the operation was to compromise the CIA's ability to respond and investigate the assassination; the method used was to use Oswald's identity in a relatively minor covert operation, maintaining and enhancing Oswald's legend as a leftist but ultimately putting CIA in an extremely difficult position. Much of the "conflicting data" are resolved if the operation was designed to provide options: CIA could cover-up (option taken) or have enough information "on the record" to demonstrate that CIA used Oswald's identity but did not use the real Oswald in the operation.

Webspinner's problem: Regardless of how much control is assured, it will not be enough to assure that the CIA as an institution can be kept "under control". No rational plan can be based on the assumption that large numbers of CIA and/or FBI folks will willingly and knowingly participate in a cover-up of the assassination of the President. Bitterness can cloud judgment: in my view, the vast majority of CIA and FBI folks would not have condoned the assassination. In addition, there is a need to stun and distract the Agency, ideally make the Agency's initial response concentrate on Cover Your Assets rather than figuring out what happened. In addition, if needed, there must be a plausible explanation for "cover-up" activities that does not imply participation in the assassination. No good black op is based on predicting a single outcome; rather, plans are made to exploit any expected outcome and always prepares for a blown operation. If Oswald's trip to Mexico City was indeed a scenario, you might come up with something like this...

  1. The "cover mission" is to use the identity of a known leftist supporter of Castro in some sort of standard covert op/provocation. No way do you risk Oswald. In addition to needing him soon:

    · Any use of the "real LHO", even with a great cover story, will raise too many in-house questions later and one slip will blow Oswald's legend.

    · But using LHO's identity strengthens his legend. "Here's the perfect guy to pretend to be---a real leftist nut, member FPCC, etc."

    · It's going a bit far to cite Hoover's 1960 memo, but there is at least the suggestion (e.g., Trucks for Cuba) that LHO's identity has been used before (thin, very thin....).

  2. The Producers gambit. [In the movie The Producers the main characters set out to produce a play that they intend will fail.] The nature of the cover mission hardly matters, since it is much better if the mission comes to naught. Success draws attention; failure fades. There are some indications of an intent to launch covert ops consistent with this interpretation:

    · FBI memo in September re: CIA program to discredit FPCC; this would provide a "justification" as to why LHO's identity was used.

    · There are consistent references to Kostikov elicited by "LHO" in "his" contacts with both Cuban and Soviets. This suggests a standard "burn" operation---identification of Kostikov as KGB and getting him kicked out. A standard low-level op.

    · Intentional failure isn't a required element, but there is no record of any specific provocation; however, if the 9/28 transcript is valid, it indicates that the KGB "nibbled".

    · What is distinctly lacking is any suggestion or hint of assassination.

  3. The available evidence indicates that LHO went to Mexico City. (Important note: each and every bit of evidence has some element of ambiguity or alternative interpretation. ) that same evidence strongly suggests that he didn't go for the reasons described by the Warren Report:

    · If LHO visited the Soviet and Cuban embassies, his actions make no sense: (a) LHO knew how the Soviet bureaucracy worked from personal experience and had been in contact with the Embassy in Washington; (b) he did not have the money to make an immediate trip even in the unlikely event that he'd received a visa; (c) the trip occurs just as LHO is out of work---for LHO to spend money on what is likely to be a hopeless task is inconsistent with his patterns of behavior. Discounting the irrationality of LHO's behavior is to beg the question.

    · LHO's behavior on the bus is almost too different than his normal behavior; the most reasonable explanation, assuming it is in fact LHO on the bus, is that it is an intentional effort to get himself noticed.

    · One (of many) possible interpretations of LHO's subsequent letter to Soviet Embassy is that he had been provided bad information about what had occurred (there is no record of "Kostin" being used either in Mexico City or in any other context). There are other possible interpretations of the letter -- it just happened to be typed and left for Ruth Paine, etc. (As an aside, one strong argument against this model would be if LHO had detailed information about what events occurred in Mexico City---any uncontrolled interrogation etc. could cause a major blow.)

  4. Multiple lines of evidence suggest that Mexico City Station was aware of and took an operational interest in LHO/"LHO" from the start. Discussed in detail elsewhere, these include: (a) statements by Scott about knowledge of Oswald, e.g., knew correct middle name was "Harvey" from the start; (b) contemporaneous rush/priority translation, etc. (c) the phone transcript of 9/28, if not valid, would almost certainly establish that this game was being played before the assassination.

  5. With the exception of the visa application at the Cuban Consulate (which has a plausible explanation), every piece of information/evidence supporting the story that LHO was doing this stuff has some element that casts doubt on the origin being LHO:

    · All of the phone calls have problems and cast doubt on the caller being LHO:

    · All calls on morning of 9/27 are in Spanish, mention Odessa as destination, and are to the military attaché (see Scott).

    · Calls on 10/1 and 9/28 are linked by internal reference and both are described by the translator as being in "horrible, almost unintelligible, Russian."

    · The content of the calls undermines the likelihood that they are all LHO -- see previous notes; the content is such that LHO is repeating questions and making other comments that just don't make sense if they are all from one person.

    · Nor is there any clear indication that there was any serious attempt at provocation (see below for mention of Nechiporenko again), and certainly none that could be interpreted as an obvious attempt to link Cuba or USSR to the assassination. In retrospect, what is lacking is any allusion that could be linked to the assassination.

    · The closest thing to a provocation is the visit to the Soviet Embassy as described by Nechiporenko.

    · Even if Nechiporenko's description is complete and accurate (a big if), the gun incident does little more than reinforce the image of LHO as an unstable person. There is no indication that "dark hints" were dropped by either LHO and/or "LHO".

    · The point is that it just so happens that Mexico City Station has plausible deniability (in fact, stronger than that) that LHO was not the person doing these things. Mexico City Station could make a convincing case it wasn't LHO if they needed to.

  6. Considerable fine tuning is possible, but `nuff said. To summarize, some of the consequences of this model are:

    · Initial response by Agency is compromised---stunned and have to consider implications of actions rather than getting to it.

    · Expands the number of people who have concerns about "full disclosure" to Agency folks who may have had nothing to do with the assassination.

    · "Legitimizing" cover-up.


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