Below are extracts from Robert Gates' book, From the Shadows. Gates, a former Director of the CIA, had little trouble clearing his book through the CIA's Publications Review Board. In fact he received documents from the CIA and the National Security Council to assist him in writing the book -- a priviledge usually granted only non-critics. We have little way of knowing where the CIA has impacted on the book's details, or to what degree Gates selectively portrays events, since he is infamous for distorting intelligence. With that in mind, Gates' book provides information on covert activities that in some cases is quite revealing and supported by subsequent developments or independent reporting. He stresses the CIA's use of the theme of "Human Rights Abuses," as a catch phrase used to speed the downfall of the Soviet Empire. This is particularly relevant today where all sorts of stories re target countries' human right abuses flood our media. Many of these stories are written by groups funded by, or presumed funded by, the U.S. government. Many such stories are picked up by the U.S. media and given wide-spread domestic as well as worldwide dissemination. Ralph McGehee Information from CIABASE files is given below: academia 96 Robert Gates gave a complete unedited manuscript to the historical intelligence collection at CIA and to the john f. kennedy school of government at harvard university. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows agent poland, USSR, 71-81 CIA able to extricate colonel kuklinski in 11/81. he had been one of CIA's most important sources of info on the USSR military -- he provided thirty thousand documents over a ten-year period. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 238 USSR, 75-77 a number of USSR dissidents arrested between 75-77. some like, anatoily shcharansky, were accused of being agents of CIA. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 99 assets 65 in those days, armed guards, turnstiles separated the [ddi & ddp/ddo]. description of hqs bldg. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 20 contragate iran, nicaragua, 81-90 dci Gates portrayal of the events surrounding iran-contra. "i believe the weight of evidence now...strongly supports the conclusion that casey did not know about the diversion of funds from the iran operation to the contras." Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 390-403 corporate interests bush adm received advice of people like paul wolfowitz, steve halley of defense, bob zoellick and dennis ross at state, and bob blackwell, condoleeza rice, and richard haass at nsc - advice proved very influential. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 454 cover 66 Gates entered the air force under CIA sponsorship for a few weeks. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 19 66 Robert Gates joined the CIA in august 66 and then entered the air force under CIA sponsorship. he went to air force officer training school in texas in 10/66. after training he assigned to whiteman air force base. he returned to d.c. in 1/68 and entered the career training program which was six months instruction in writing intel reports, setting up meetings with agents, dead drops, studying the USSR, learning about satellite collection programs, the intel bureaucracy, and surveillance. Gates' cover then was department of defense. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 21-2 covert a 76-80 carter adm, contrary to reports, from outset turned to CIA for covert ops. but found there was a lack of enthusiasm and a lack of boldness and imagination in implementing carter's findings to counter USSR and cuban aggression against the third world. brzezinski used nsc for covert action and virtually all of these efforts have remained shielded from public view. finding to promote democracy on grenada and to support resistance to the gvt there. the senate intel committee expressed its strong displeasure. so CIA ceased all covert ops directed at grenada. Gates, r. (1996). from the shadows 143 afghanistan, USSR, 79-89 nio arnold horelick's paper on possible USSR reactions to covert ops in afghanistan. on 7/3/79, six months before the soviets invaded afghanistan, carter signed a finding to help the mujahedin covertly. it authorized support for propaganda and other psychological ops in afghan; establishment of radio ops through third-countries; and provision either unilaterally or through third countries, of support for guerrillas in cash or nonmilitary supplies. USSR massively intervened on 12/24/79, the small covert op of about a half a million dollars, within a year grew to tens of millions. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 144-8 angola, 85 on 11/12/85, reagan signed a finding on angola authorizing lethal assistance to unita. CIA formed a special task force to administer the program and weapons and other equipment were soon flowing to savimbi. our staging base for air support sent materials to jamba. we used one c-130. in 2/86 the nsc approved providing savimbi with stinger missiles and tow antiarmor weapons. we were dumbfounded by the remarkable effectiveness of the missiles. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 347 eastern europe, USSR, 75-9 the national intel officer for the USSR, arnold horelick, wrote to head of u.s. analysts, robert bowie, on 11/18/77 posing questions re brzezinski's wishes re covert ops in that area. CIA stayed clear of direct support or contact with soviet dissidents in this period while it worked to feed dissident writings back to the USSR. throughout remainder of the carter adm, and even into the reagan adm, all efforts had the effect of attacking the legitimacy of the soviet government. all efforts to promote covert actions stirring up soviet nationalities problem failed inside the u.s. govt. but radio free europe and radio liberty were effective. after helsinki final act, and revival of dissidents and proliferation of orgs, western newsmen would obtain writings of soviet dissidents or interviews with them and publicize them in the u.s. rl or rfe would broadcast them back into the USSR and CIA would clandestinely smuggle written versions back into e. europe and USSR. carter through human rights policies, became first president since truman to challenge directly the legitimacy of the soviet govt. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 90-96 iran, 79-80 after hostages seized, six americans escaped to the canadian embassy, where they were hidden. a CIA officer using commercial cover, brought false identities for the six and managed to get them out. efforts via c-130 transport to rescue the hostages. the CIA scouted a landing site for desert one and got info re the inside of the embassy compound. site identified and office of technical services devised battery-powered landing lights that could be easily switched on and off remotely from air. a trial flight two weeks before attempt. one pilot placed lights and another scouted area on a motorcycle. CIA acquired source inside the embassy and rented a warehouse and acquired trucks for the rescue. military complained that CIA efforts inadequate. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 154 latin america, nicaragua, el salvador, 79-80 carter signed findings on both countries in late july 79. nicaraguan finding based primarily on propaganda - exposing the sandinistas and the cuban role. el salvador finding dealt with helping the gvt deal with the insurgency. carter signed a broader finding authorizing CIA actions to counter the soviets and cubans throughout latin america. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 151-2 poland, 81-87 casey's view that afl-cio was doing a first rate job in poland -- better than CIA could do. there was considerable sharing of info about developments in poland with the vatican, sometimes through dci casey, sometimes through dick waters. Gates was unaware of a direct CIA link to solidarity - we worked through third parties and intermediaries in western europe. most of what CIA provided was printing materials, commo equipment, and other supplies for waging underground political warfare. there was no lethal assistance. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 237-8 poland, 85-87 in poland in march CIA printed and smuggled in 40,000 postcards with a photo of a priest who had been beaten to death by security forces. in may CIA arranged a pro-solidarity demonstration at a soccer match with a large banner seen on tv. in june CIA used a map by hitler's foreign minister and the soviet's molotov that indicated the partition of poland. in 11/85, CIA pulled out all stops to make gorbachev feel unwelcome in geneva with all sorts of anti-soviet demonstrations, meetings, exhibits, and other activities. publicized the soviet role in cambodia. throughout 85, 86, CIA sponsored many demonstrations, protests, meetings, conferences, press articles, tv shows, exhibitions to focus world attention on the soviet role in afghanistan. these efforts in which american hand concealed complemented the overt coverage on voa and official u.s. channels. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 358 third world, 76-80 carter began numerous covert ops to counter soviets in the third world. there were findings on grenada, jamaica, nicaragua, el salvador and yemen. they mostly confined prior to 80 - to nonlethal measures - these activities vastly expanded under reagan. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 178 yemen, 79-83 the marxist gvt of the pdry attacked the yemen arab republic on 2-3/79. CIA to resolve to pursue with saudi's, question of their views on the leadership of the yar. covert assistance to yar was agreed upon and the president signed a finding on 7/3/79. Gates, r. (1996). from the shadows 150 death squads el salvador, 84-87 Gates discusses issue. Gates, r. (1996). from the shadows 304-5 economic war USSR, 78-80 carter in 7/78 imposed economic sanctions on the USSR - this set stage for intensification of the econ war against the USSR by reagan. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 177 history 69 CIA totally dominated by the directorate of ops in 69 -- it is the heart and soul of the CIA. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 32 intel f cuba, USSR, 79-80 fiasco -- the soviet brigade in cuba. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 155-60 middle east, 73 outbreak of yon kippur war was an embarrassment for CIA -- the national intel daily of that morning suggested there was not likely to be a conflict. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 401 USSR, 64-75 in mid to late 60s and early 70s, CIA did not foresee massive soviet effort to match and then surpass the u.s. in strategic missile numbers and capabilities - and did not understand soviet intentions. CIA paid a high price for this failure in eyes of the new president and sod, melvin laird. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 29 USSR, 85-90 CIA's day-to-day political reporting on the soviet union was accurate, but limited by no inside sources. we did not get a broader perspective. inside CIA's analytical office there was a growing concern that the downward spiraling USSR economy could not sustain military programs. lack of communication between economists and military experts seemed hopeless. head of that office, was doug maceachin. top officials viewed Gates as an advocate that nothing of consequence was happening - i was uneasy with our analysis - however i might defend it externally. i funded a group of outside experts headed by harry rowen that was critical of CIA's statistical portrayal of the USSR economy. the effect [of all the events in 89] were unforeseen by the CIA. the CIA had no idea in january 89 that a tidal wave of history re the USSR was about to happen. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 386-7,439-49 USSR, 85-90 on foreign policy and defense issues, we simply kept pace with gorbachev's action; but after 86, we more often than not failed to anticipate how far he would go. we were accurate about gorbachev's handling of domestic problems in the USSR and his failure to come to grips with those problems. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 344 USSR, cambodia, nixon disdained intel on soviet missile deployments -- he paid little attention to the president's daily brief. nixon also blamed the CIA for failure to predict the 1970 lon nol coup in cambodia. in 71, CIA underestimated reaction of the viet cong to the south vietnamese invasion in laos op lam song 719. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 31 USSR, east europe, 87-90 CIA watching situation in the region and we were only beginning to realize how small and inadequate were our collection capabilities and expertise on non-russian republics. Gates, r. (1996). from the shadows 510 USSR, east europe, 89-90 5/28/89 article in the washington post said, "Gates has become to the world of sovietology what eeyore is to pooh corner -- someone capable of finding a dark lining in even the brightest cloud." Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 474 USSR, russia, 85-91 in a 95 reassessment re ames and soviet double agents and their influence on u.s. policy -- there were thirty-five clandestine reports from know USSR double agents and sixty reports from suspected double agents sent to policymakers over the years. Gates, r. (1996). from the shadows 17 USSR, russia, 85-95 of thirty-five clandestine reports known to have come from double agents (and sixty reports from suspected double agents that were sent to policymakers over a ten year period, most concerned technical characteristics of soviet weapons systems. Gates, r. (1996). from the shadows 17 intel prod 76-80 dci turner at first briefed carter every two weeks and then longer intervals. carter found them boring. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 141 81-87 dci casey appalled at lackadaisical approach to key issues. in spring 82, he demanded intel estimates be more aggressive and timely. he took primary focus on the USSR and third world. he paid relatively little attention to china or the rest of asia, south asia, or developments in the third world that did not somehow relate back to opportunities or challenges re the USSR and its surroGates. while the directorate of ops collected info on USSR covert actions around world the soviets espionage acts against others (non-nato) and their propaganda nets, these reports regarded as operational and info rarely sent outside the do. ddo john stein finally let analysts pore through ops files of the ddo -- a CIA ability to monitor soviet covert ops in an organized manner was born 35 years into the cold war. casey brought in people to write intel -- professor henry (harry) rowen of stanford appointed chairman of the national intel council. harry had been head of rand corporation. he lasted two years. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 201-8 intel s 60-70 CIA has unparalleled ability to describe existing military capabilities and technical characteristics of weapons. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 33 USSR, russia, 89-90 in september 89, the CIA's soviet office issued an assessment: "gorbachev's domestic gambles and instability." paper by grey hodnett, was extremely influential in shaping thinking at the white house and we began planning for the possible collapse of the USSR. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 514 intel-policy 76-80 dci turner occasionally imposed his views and approach on analysis and estimates - this regarded as turner wanting to get his way rather than as politically motivated. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 139 81-87 dci casey had his own foreign policy agenda and as a cabinet member, pursued that agenda vigorously and often in opposition to the sec of state. casey boasted about this and on 12/11/83 said, "our estimating program has become a powerful instrument in forcing the pace in the policy area." he offered his own views in meetings without being explicit that they were personal or from the intel community. Gates, r. (1996). from the shadows 286 81-87 dci casey's drafted cover notes, talking points, and letters did not offer any balance or pretense of objectivity - his was a transparent advocacy. [yet} dir of intel preserved its objectivity and its integrity. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 333 investigation of 81 reagan's transition team for CIA included CIA vets john boss, george carver, and walter pforzheimer. the politicos were angelo codevilla, ken de graffenreid, mark schneider and others. the later were hard line conservatives. when casey named dci he simply threw out the team. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 191-3 leaks 81-87 the flow of leaks out of reagan adm became a gusher. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 215 liaison eastern europe, 89-90 CIA moved quickly to establish contact with security services of the new governments of e. europe to obtain info on USSR espionage ops run with the warsaw pact nations, to provide vital assistance, to gain access to soviet military and kgb commo equipment, and to lay foundations for future cooperation. Gates, r. (1996). from the shadows 469 nsc 74 Robert Gates assigned to the nsc. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 53 81-87 the national security adviser did not play much of a role during the first six years of the reagan adm. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 284 87-90 Gates's duty at nsc under bush adm, apart from support to the president and scowcroft, was to oversee the interagency nsc process -- policy and contingency planning, and the management of day-to-day national security ops. the deputies committee, included robert kimmit of state, paul wolfowitz of defense, dick kerr deputy dci; and air force general robert herres and dave jeremiah. group, supplemented at times by others, would develop the medium - and long-range objectives of u.s. policy. after the panama coup, the group handled crisis management for bush. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 458-9 organizations hungaria, romania, czechoslovakia, 75-93 conference on security and cooperation in europe (csce). Gates an advance man went to helsinki stopping enroute in poland, romania and yugoslavia. the soviet empire began to crack at helsinki. first experienced in poland with the "movement in defense of human and citizen rights." in promoting csce, and agreeing to human rights provisions the soviets made a historic miscalculation. helsinki stimulated dissident activity in eastern europe. this in turn stimulated growth of nongovernmental orgs in e. europe and the USSR. CIA explained to carter adm why the USSR was so sensitive about its aggressive human rights approach in a 2/28/77 memo to brzezinski. "charter 77" a movement in prague of 500 intellectuals in czechoslovakia endorsed by hungarian and romanian intellectuals. the CIA stated the USSR saw that the csce - the helsinki conference - was causing dissidence to spread. carter and human rights: did it matter? the helsinki accords and the spread of human rights monitoring groups in e europe. CIA clandestinely obtained in early 77, a hungarian leader's description of the USSR leadership feeling the human rights campaign was a threat to its power. promoting human rights went far beyond presidential statements and carter approved an unprecedented white house effort to attack legitimacy of the USSR govt. the CIA's covert action staff (cas) proposed: 1) enhanced clandestine distribution of russian-language books and periodicals by dissident authors and of samizdat (dissident writings by authors in the USSR circulated privately in country); 2) book publishing program with subsidies to east european-oriented journals to be distributed in e. europe; 3) a minorities program to infiltrate written materials in diverse ethnic regions of the USSR - mostly the ukraine. one such ethnic group supported by CIA to go from the u.s. to europe with an expanded charter; support to groups in w. europe promoting soviet observance of human rights. book publishing proposal approved by scc in 10/77. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 91-2 poland, 76-80 in summer 76 after helsinki conference, new orgs and publications started. "committee for the defense of workers," (kor), the "movement in defense of human and citizen rights," "young poland movement," soon emerged. groups arrested and others began to circulate leaflets demanding concessions from the gvt. "free trade union paper," circulated. question of afl-cio support. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 163-5 org, intel 76-80 dci turner abolished the directorate of intel and renamed it the national foreign assessment center, with robert bowie as its director. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 138 oversight 81-87 with dci casey's background, he was guilty of contempt of congress from the day he was sworn in as dci. he had zero patience with congressional meddling in ops. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 213 overthrow libya, 81-85 from early 81 forward, the reagan adm never abandoned efforts to block qaddafi abroad, challenge him millitarily and overthrow him. after the minelaying of the ghat, CIA intensified its efforts to identify libyan economic, military and political vulnerabilities. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 322 personnel 69 CIA totally dominated by the directorate of ops (do). its division chiefs (near east, soviet bloc, etc) were powerful in their own right. the do was the heart and soul of CIA. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 32 72 james schlesinger purged about seven percent of the CIA. fritz ermarth, from the rand corporation was one of dci schlesinger's assistants. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 42,3 73 james schlesinger purged about seven percent of CIA people in all directorates by firing or forced resignations or retirements. the directorate of ops took the largest hit. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 42 76-80 in 76 the directorate of ops concluded its staffing level should be reduced by 1,350 positions over a year period. turner reduced the cut to 820 in two years. number of people outright fired was 20 and less than 150 forced to retire early. the heartless notice was dictated by the legal officers' advice to forestall law suits. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 139 81-85 douglas george, was head of CIA's arms control intel staff. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 260 81-87 Gates wrote dci casey: as a result of lack or innovative and creative personnel...CIA is full of people waiting for retirement. the CIA has a case of advanced bureaucratic arteriosclerosis, directorate of ops has lost its spark. these bureaucrats have led to the decline in quality of intel collection and analysis.. CIA is turning into the department of agriculture. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 223-4 82 dci casey said of CIA personnel: the analysis and ops units need rebuilding. the analysis has been academic, soft. on ops, the paramilitary, counterintel, and covert actions were run down. needed more non-official cover. to corral casey's lawless ops the do created a new associate deputy director for ops, a position to oversee casey's private-sector initiative. Gates called casey one of the smartest people Gates had ever known. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 209-17 afghanistan, near east division, 84-85 charles cogan, chief of the near east division lived and worked in region for many years. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 320 howard stoertz a CIA negotiator on salt. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 34,43-4 sam hoskinson one of dci schlesinger's special assistants. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 34 the directorate of ops (do) recruitees mostly white, anglo-saxons; middle and upper class; liberal arts college graduates; in their mid to late twenties; engaging hale fellows well-met. few non-caucasians, few women, few ethnics. do a closed circle. attitude if info isn't stolen it is not worth having. counterintel -- can't beat the polygraph. in 81, burdened by years of bureaucratic encrustation do was hard-pressed for resources, unimaginative, a blinded fraternity. even carter adm had been disappointed by the lack of imagination and boldness. casey as dci found, instead of a clandestine dagger, a stifling bureaucracy -- he tried to bypass. he appointed max hugel as do. after 70 days of criticisms he resigned. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 208-210 USSR, 78-85 ddi experts on the USSR robert blackwell, grey hodnett, kay oliver, george holt and others. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 185 USSR, 85-86 jack matlock was senior soviet expert on nsc. kay oliver was an experienced analyst of the soviet office. Gates, r. (1996). from the shadows 342 policy 81-89 reagan adm from outset targeted covert action, foreign assistance, diplomacy, and even direct military assistance on third world battlegrounds in opposition to the soviets, cubans, libyans and anyone perceived to be a surrogate of the USSR. casey came to CIA primarily to wage war against the USSR. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 197-9 afghanistan, 84-89 in 3/85 a new national security decision directive 166 that set forth the u.s. objective to win in afghanistan. to push the soviets out. all through 85 we poured weapons into afghanistan, we approved a logistics base and getting supplies into afghanistan - laying the basis for the mujahedin success in 86-87. we imported thousands of chinese mules. a number of arabs from other countries traveled there to fight the holy war against the USSR. they came from syria, iraq, algeria and elsewhere. they fought with islamic fundamentalist groups particularly that headed by abdul rasul sayyaf. years later these began showing up around the world, from the middle east to new york, still fighting the holy war - only including the u.s. among their enemies. we provided stinger missiles. in 2/86 we decided to give 400 stingers to the mujahedin. they were very effective. providing the stingers was a major turning point in the war. Gates, r. (1996). from the shadows 348-50 afghanistan, saudi arabia, pakistan, 82-87 while dci casey in saudi arabia, they agreed to raise their contribution to the op in afghanistan to $75 million - which required the u.s. raise its contribution by a total of $50 million. further discussion of budget figures for the op. Gates, r. (1996). From The Shadows 320-1 central america, 81-87 by end of 82, a fundamental divisions existed between CIA career professionals and casey. casey often bypassed ddci inman an worked directly with dewey clarridge re central america. mcmahon represented the CIA career officials. casey was a zealot on central america. by fall of 82, clarridge wrought a bureaucratic wonder - he managed to build a contra force of nearly 3,500 guerrillas - 2,300 spanish-speaking fighters, 900 miskito indians, and some 500 with pastora. his early efforts sped by taking over support of 500 contras funded by the argentine junta. when the junta disappeared the u.s. inherited another 2000 contras from the argentinians.